A “qussa” means “story”. A Qussa transmits narratives about the past and construct an imaginary of folkloric cultural and historical heritage of a region. Palestinian women are traditionally tellers of these stories in familiar gatherings about the past, about Palestinian history mixed with fantasy and life experiences (Sayigh, 1998). It is no doubt that Palestinian women carry heritage, but also a strong commitment with popular resistance, as Vanessa Farr argues: “It brings to light the ways in which women in this military occupation may be able to exploit small, temporary, invisible forms of resistance by using tactics that exploit the gaping cracks within urban spaces and the systems of power” (Farr, 2012). This group is affected by many multiple oppressions: structures of the patriarchy that shape women’s roles, their freedom of movement, thinking or speaking; capitalist structures that spoil equal labour distribution, as well as ecologic disasters; and, the Israeli apartheid that colonises their land and their bodies. Palestinian women, therefore, are situated in the borderland of structural and systematic discriminations.
Emergence and generations of Palestinian women activists
Women’s participation in the national liberation movement evolved along with Palestinian struggle with higher or lower influence even before the establishment and consolidation of the Israeli State in 1948. Before I World War and the British Mandate in Palestine, the women’s movement already existed and was shaped by the metropolis colonialist policies that were characterized mainly as “disciplinary and emancipatory” in conservative discourses (Fleischmann, 2000; 2003). Historical and political causes of the conflict and Israeli occupation in Palestine will not be explained in detail, since it is not the aim of this article, even if it is essential to understand the movement within a historical and political context for a better comprehension through interesting bibliographical recommendations[1]. After the consolidation of Zionism in the region and the creation of a Jewish State in 1948, the rise of the Palestinian National Movement was structured in different political options. Women’s participation was sporadic and they only involved themselves in times of crises through social institutions, such as charitable works and evolving to more service-oriented initiatives (health care, fund-raising, clothing and food, etc., that participated as “support” for political actions such as general strikes, rebellions and war times). Along these decades, feminist emancipatory proposals were subordinated to the national struggle and not a priority in institutional Palestinian politics (Dajani, 1994; Kawar, 1997). Therefore, women’s political and social position in society remained the same, in spite of their activism against the Occupation and patriarchal traditions (Hiltermann, 1991).
Feminist emancipatory proposals were subordinated to the national struggle and not a priority in institutional Palestinian politics.
Amal Kawar divides Palestinian women’s movement into three generations classified according to specific political periods. The first one refers to the establishment of the Israeli State and the Nakba (or catastrophe in Arabic) in 1948 that caused a massive exile of Palestinian refugees as well as an ethnic cleansing process in the territory (Sa’adi & Abu-Lughod, 2007; Kawar, 1997). This generation – also called, the “mother’s generation” – is characterized by women activists that were born in the 1920s and participated in charitable work organisations and social initiatives after witnessing the Nakba, highly affected and traumatized by those memories. The second generation takes place during the “Arab nationalist period” and leftist socialist movements around the world (such as the communist Cuban armed revolution and Che Guevara’s postulates) during the 1950s and 1960s with important Arab political figures such as Abdel Nasser (Egypt) who intervened and highly influenced Palestinian liberation movement of the time or Yasser Arafat (PLO leader). During the 60s, women promoted the creation of unions such as the “General Union of Palestinian Women” (linked to the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, PLO), and it was considered the first organisation dedicated to women that opened a window of opportunity for them to participate in the national struggle movement within an institutional and political framework – mainly activist coming from middle-upper class socio-economic background (Kawar, 1997). For example, an important woman figure in this period is Leila Khaled, communist guerrillera of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The third generation is composed by women born during the 1967 war with border Arab states, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Lebanon and Iraq – or the Six-day war – with the Israeli biggest occupation of Palestinian territories (East Jerusalem, West Bank and Golan Heights). These women, born during the war, were not only affected by it, but also by their previous generation of siblings that organised important political structures and potentiated new women’s unions during the 80s (Kawar, 1997).
Palestinian socio-political elites and leaders encouraged certain images of “women” and their supposed role in society. First, as a “fertile mother” to reproduce the nation and its cultural heritage and as a symbol of the “land”: strong and protective (Antonius, 1979). In fact, Yasser Arafat was a defender of the “demographic war” stating that women should have at least 12 children each. Second, as a representation of “national honour” and “vulnerable beloved” woman, which is a highly present patriarchal value in Palestinian society. The concept of “honour” for women, facing family, a community or society is as important as life itself and women even put their honour above personal interest. Many feminist activists fought this idea spreading this saying: “al-ard wala al-‘ard”, which means “land before honour” (Abdulhadi, 1998). This issue was – and still is – an important challenge for political mobilization, since women have huge difficulties when joining political committees or organisations because of “rumorology” from their community members (family, neighbours) on their “moral” behaviour (Antonius, 1979).
Women that participated in these early organisations during the 40s, 60s and 80s were mainly from upper-middle class social strata, which meant that they were able to have a superior-level education in Palestine or abroad studies in Western universities and, therefore, adopted liberal ideologies. But what characterized following periods of women’s movement is that not only upper-middle class liberal students participated in the movement, but also other women coming from villages or refugee camps (Hiltermann, 1991).
Palestinian women and the uprisings (first and second intifada)
Because of the first intifada, women decided to take action and many committees created during the 80s were consolidated under the Women’s Work Committee that coordinated and organised programmes to mobilize other sectors from society. WWC programmes were directed to provide skills (such as, embroidery, food processing) to women in order to provide for themselves and be independent, as well as education (literacy, health education…etc) programmes for villages and refugee camps with day-care centres to take care of their children while women were being educated through these committees. In these programmes, women started to meet each other and engaged political discussions as a strategy to raise consciousness and awareness about women’s role in society and the national liberation process.
However, the WWC split into four coordination committees because of different political and ideological axis: The Federation of Palestinian Women’s Action Committees (FPAWAC) identified with the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP); the Union of Palestinian Women’s Committees (UWWC) aligned with the Palestine Communist Party (PCP); the Union of Palestinian Women’s Committees (UPWC) that depended on the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) focusing on working, middle-class urban, young women; and Women’s Committees for Social Work (WCSW) that leaned towards Fatah that was more concerned with charitable work and services to women (Hiltermann, 1991). At that moment, it was possible to talk about the beginning of a wide-spread Palestinian Women’s Movement (Jad, 2008) legitimized on mobilized grassroots organisations. Throughout all these committees, popular activism had an important influence in women’s lives, but did not affect patriarchal and traditional structures or women’s roles in society, since the activities and programmes developed in them were directed to provide care services (health, education, etc). Parallelly to these institutional committees, many women started to organise production and agricultural cooperatives in order to satisfy their survival needs producing food, canned goods, jams, traditional Palestinian clothing, embroidery, handcrafts, etc., and this fact highly contributed to transforming women’s role in domestic economy – being active actors in national production – as well as economic independence that would eventually lead to social and political emancipation. Furthermore, active participation of women in these cooperatives also raised awareness not only on their essential role in society but as valuable human beings with the same abilities and capacities as men. Cooperatives had highly positive results for women to participate in the local community-life and popular networking to be mobilized outside the house (Hiltermann, 1991). In addition, women’s active participation in political spheres was not enough to challenge the status quo because of national liberation as the one and only priority that Palestinian – political men – elites and Israeli policies that consciously reproduced this patterns through “gender” occupation strategies (Abdulhadi, 1998).
During the 90s, the Palestinian Women’s Movement adopted new structures because of specific political opportunities historically produced and affected by “pre-existing cultural context of gender hierarchy, local conditions and international and regional developments[2]” (Abdulhadi, 1998: 670). In 1993, the feminist organisation “El-Fanar” published a directory of Palestinian Women organisations listing almost 174 organisations picturing a new decentralized structure within the Palestinian women’s movement with a clear shift from Islamist women against Hamas impositions in Gaza and important academic publications such as “Woman”, “Ishtar”, “Women’s Voice” or “Women’s affair” developed studies related to women’s issues. In addition, because of these publications, the “Women’s Studies Program” of Bir Zeit University was founded with the collaboration of important Palestinian scholars that promoted feminist proposals, political affairs and women’s rights (Abdulhadi, 1998).
The women’s movement after the uprising was constructed on the heritage of previous political culture from women’s movements – as previously described – that developed many different collective networks and forms of action locally and internationally. In this sense, elites were also formed by “accommodated” women that accepted the status quo – sometimes, as a survival strategy – and other more “oppositional” perspectives, usually from an upper-middle social class that could afford education – therefore, tools for confrontation – as well as economic stability. Secular women argued about the accommodational position of Islamist women, while some sector of Islamic women aligned with Islamic feminist proposals of ijtihad (the reinterpretation of Qur’an verses) in order to engage women’s emancipation from male-dominance in social, political, cultural and economic spaces (Abdulhadi, 1998). Also, many “radical” feminist activists’ sectors that came from academia (as researchers or teachers) also had a presence in the women’s movement spectrum. In rural regions without easy access to education, health, etc., and peripheral areas with small villages (such as Zbayadat, Negev or Nabi Salih) that are still under colonialist process – through land occupation, settlement constructions and apartheid policies – also represented strong resistance even if their relationship with institutional-organised political action was weak (Sayigh, 1981). The movement, therefore, had a multiplicity of voices that share or differ various projects, but all aimed for women’s emancipation.
After the second intifada or post-Oslo period, the Israeli response to the riots such as establishing heavier siege policies in the Gaza Strip, house demolitions, more checkpoints and other political, social and economic limitations to the Palestinian people caused important structural changes. After the death of nearly 3000 victims and 40.000 wounded (most of them, men), women found themselves in a difficult situation and a shifting process regarding their role and “had to endure the breadwinners without prior experience or preparation. Caring for the injured and disabled was a major burden on women” (Kuttab, 2012). In this sense, the women’s resistance movement faced a shifting process as well: a process of elitist, secular and professionalized NGO-zation – local and internationally – substituted the feminist-nationalistic agenda of collective interests articulated under political initiatives with a set of decontextualizing projects that did not consider economic, social and political factors of Palestinian women’s issues (Jad, 2008; Kuttab, 2008). Palestinian NGOs gathered 80% of direct or indirect programmes related to women (Powers, 2003). This is, in some way, related to weak institutional policies by the Palestinian Authority and internal divisions within the different women’s organisations and failing attempts to create a “unitarian front” for women’s committees, as well as socioeconomic deterioration (high unemployment rates), peace negotiation failure and frustration (Kuttab, 2008).
The women’s resistance movement faced a shifting process as well: a process of elitist, secular and professionalized NGO-zation substituted the feminist-nationalistic agenda.
The focus adopted by different technical NGOs that operated in the region was universalist ignoring local feminisms despite their aims of “empowering” women and international funding were not efficiently managed (because of weak communication infrastructures, bank services, etc.). These organisations omitted women’s activist, since they lacked “management project skills”, even if their mobilization power was high. This professionalism logic limited civil society’s agenda, since the one that prevailed was the donors’ one (from international organisations such as the World Bank, IMF or even the UN that, sometimes, had a particular agenda for the Middle East) and slogans of “power for women” were, actually, “power over women” (Jad, 2008). Furthermore, donor’s accountability in this “project-oriented” logic in women’s NGOs caused short-time activities to handle survival necessities, instead of approaching long-term structural issues (Farr, 2012). Today, the movement is fragmented and NGOs reproduce international frameworks in order to establish their own agenda, delinked from grassroots organisations and local identity (Kuttab, 2008) and less focused on national liberation. This fact can be considered as one of the main challenges that the movement is suffering currently, as well as strong geographic divisions that limit community proliferation and alienation from youngest generations of women increasingly away from their “historical political culture” (Farr, 2012).
[1] Pappe, I (2004). A history of modern Palestine: One land, two peoples. Cambridge University Press; Chosmky, N. & Pappe, I. (2015). On Palestine. Penguin Books.
[2] Such as the collapse of the socialist bloc that discouraged Marxism among Arab nationalistic leaders, the rise of Islamism as an opposition force to western influence in the region and the less support to the PLO from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states that limited its funding (Abdulhadi, 1998).
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